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The extent to which shareholders should beallowed to participate in the companies in
which they own shares is an important issue for
contemporary corporate governance.1 In Australia,
shareholder participation has recently attracted
significant attention among commentators, for
two reasons: 
• since 1 July 2005, listed companies must now
submit a remuneration report on director and
senior executive pay levels to a ‘non-binding’
vote of shareholders at the company’s AGM,2
and 
• the Federal Government’s decision to abolish
the ‘100 member rule’ (allowing 100 or more
shareholders to requisition an extraordinary
general meeting of the company) in s 249D of
the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act), instead,
reducing from 100 to 20 the number of
shareholders required to bring a resolution at a
company’s general meeting under s 249N of
the Act.3
Despite the current international debate on
the virtues of shareholder participation,4 for large
public companies in particular, it is well-settled
Australian government policy that enhancing
shareholder participation is an important
component of effective corporate governance
reform. The government’s September 2002 ‘CLERP
9’ Discussion Paper (the impetus for which was
the high-profile collapses of Ansett, HIH and
One.Tel in Australia) stated that:
‘The role of shareholders is recognised as
critical for good corporate governance practice.
Shareholders do not assume responsibility for day-
to-day management of a corporation. However,
they can influence the behaviour of the
corporation over the longer term through
exercising influence on fundamental matters. …'
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
have widespread acceptance as a framework for
good corporate governance practices. The first of
those principles refers to basic shareholder rights
to participate effectively and vote in general
meetings. In particular, these basic shareholder
rights are mentioned as a key component of a
good corporate governance framework.
CLERP 9 reforms
In the ‘CLERP 9’ Discussion Paper, the
government proposed initiatives to improve
communication with shareholders, and to
encourage their active involvement in company
meetings. The CLERP 9 Act (the Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth)) eventually
came into force on 1 July 2004, and implemented
a number of important amendments to the Act,
which are designed to facilitate and promote the
exercise by shareholders of important governance
rights (being informed of company activities, as
well as to participate in and to vote at general
meetings of the company).5
The key amendments in this area are 
designed to:
• encourage companies to embrace technology
(particularly the internet and email) and forms
of electronic communication (such as web
casting) to improve communication with
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shareholders, particularly facilitating the
distribution of notices of meeting and annual
reports through electronic
means,6
• encourage shorter and more
comprehensible notices of
company meetings so that
shareholders can fully
understand the contents of
the notices (see s 249L(3)
which introduced a
requirement that notices are
worded and presented in a
‘clear, concise and effective
manner’)
• improve shareholder access
to general meetings by








• make shareholders better
informed by requiring listed
company directors to
disclose other directorships held in the three
years prior to the end of the financial year to
which the report relates,8 and requiring that the
qualifications and experience of the company
secretary be included in the directors’ report.9
In addition, the CLERP 9 Act introduced a new
requirement under the Act for listed companies to
include a so-called ‘Management Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A)’ review in their annual report.
This review must include sufficient information to
enable shareholders to make an informed
assessment of the entity’s operations, financial
position and business strategies and its future
prospects.10 This idea is built on existing ASX Listing
Rule 4.10.17, requiring an ASX-listed company’s
annual report to include a review of operations and
activities.
ASX Corporate Governance 
Council principles
Preceding the implementation of the CLERP 9
reforms was the release of the ASX Corporate
Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, which
outlined 10 principles of good corporate
governance, and 28 recommendations for achieving
good corporate governance practices (which listed
companies must adhere to, or otherwise explain
their departure from one or more of the
recommendations).11
Principle 6 of the ASX guidelines is: ‘Respect the
rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise
of those rights’. It is recommended that, to
adequately respect the rights of
shareholders, listed companies should
design and disclose a communications
strategy to promote effective
communication with shareholders, and
encourage effective participation at general
meetings. This should include how best to
take advantage, wherever practicable, of new
technologies to improve shareholder
participation, and enhance market
awareness of company information through
electronic means. 
Further, it is recommended that listed
companies should use general meetings
effectively to communicate with
shareholders and allow reasonable
opportunity for informed participation.12
The ASX Corporate Governance Council has
prepared guidelines to help companies
improve shareholder participation through
the design and content of notices, and
through the conduct of the company’s
meeting.13
So as you can see, some significant
initiatives have been implemented over the
past few years to try to ensure that shareholder
participation is a central component of a company’s
governance arrangements. Despite this, what can
also be seen when considering the above initiatives
is that lawmakers and regulators have only been
prepared to go so far in facilitating shareholder
participation.
Do these reforms go far enough?
In fact, in our view, while the reforms are intended to
significantly empower shareholders, they effectively do no
such thing. Generally speaking, the reforms and
initiatives directed at shareholder participation
merely provide for shareholders to be better
informed about the decisions and activities engaged
in by the company, and provide shareholders with
greater opportunity to be able to participate in the
annual general meetings and exercise their veto
rights over decisions requiring the endorsement of
shareholders. They do not go beyond that and enable
shareholders to actually participate in the formulation of
decisions and strategies of the corporation — something
that we believe is necessary for real shareholder
participation.14
According to the New Oxford Dictionary of
English, ‘participant’ is defined as ‘a person who
takes part in something’ with the example given
that ‘staff are to be active participants in the
decision-making process’. It then goes on to provide
that the Latin translation of ‘participant’ is ‘sharing
in’.15 This reinforces that real participation by
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shareholders is not achieved simply by informing
shareholders of decisions that are made, and
empowering shareholders to veto decisions at the
annual general meeting. Under this approach,
shareholders are not participants in the actual
decision-making process. Shareholder corporate
governance rights really only kick in after the
decisions of the company have already been
made. 
Shareholders can exercise voting rights at the
general meeting in an attempt to veto a decision
and, hence, this could be considered to be
participating at least in some way in the decision-
making process. In reality, however, individual
shareholders in public listed companies very rarely
have the voting power or influence to veto
decisions or even to have any input into how the
decision is formed. 
While reverting back to the dictionary
definition of ‘participate’ might be dismissed by
some as mere semantics, it does help to reinforce
the argument that the so-called shareholder
participation movement is not promoting
‘participation’ in the real sense of the word. In our
book, Principles of Contemporary Corporate
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2005) we
outline two central proposals for reform to achieve
real shareholder participation in contemporary
corporate governance. 
The first proposal is a pragmatic one,
recommending that directors should be required
to be equity stakeholders in the company.16 That
is, if our thesis is that real shareholder
participation entails actually participation in the
formulation of decisions and strategies of the
corporation, let’s make the individuals already
involved in this formulation process, shareholders.
The second proposal is that a shareholder
committee should be embedded in the governance
structure of all public companies to provide a
vehicle through which shareholders can have
input into the activities of such companies.17
Proposal that directors be
shareholders in the company
The normal response of academics and other
commentators to the perceived problem of
shareholder passivity in the large modern
corporation is to strengthen the rights and
remedies of shareholders, as a means of protecting
them from the tyranny of the board and majority
shareholders. Rarely do commentators,
particularly in Australia, put forward the idea of
shareholder and director ‘alignment’18, that is,
directors also being made shareholders in the
company.19
A common feature of corporate governance
reform packages in Australia (ASX Corporate
Governance Council recommendations), the
United Kingdom (the Combined Code) and the
United States (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and
NYSE Listing Rules) is a preference for
'independent' directors. While the meaning of
'independence' in this context is not without some
degree of uncertainty, in Australia at least one
requirement for 'independence' is that directors
must not be substantial shareholders of the
company.20 What is meant by ‘substantial’ is not
discussed in the guidelines but is rather a
judgment left to the board. 
In this respect, it is assumed that lack of such
independence is undesirable. This is reflected by
the fact that directors must establish, and justify
in the annual report and to shareholders, that
holding beyond a certain amount of shares does
not jeopardise the characterisation of directors as
being independent, and does not (at least
doctrinally) place a barrier between shareholding
and directorship. So while shareholding is not
ruled out for directors, their right to hold shares is
significantly curtailed. This might be considered to
provide an impenetrable barrier to our proposal
being implemented. 
There is, however, a significant degree of
normative and theoretical literature which
suggests that the drive to having more
independent directors is misguided, and that
requiring directors to be shareholders (even
significant shareholders) in the company may not
be such a bad thing at all. As we point out in our
book, it is suggested that one of the fundamental
causes for the poor financial decisions of many
company directors may indeed be that they are
spending somebody else's money, and they are not
personally liable for the losses if their decisions
were based on poor business judgments. Thus, a
key to better corporate management may lie in a
closer alignment between the interests of the
shareholders and directors — to the maximum
extent possible, their fortunes should rise and fall
together. This would reduce the degree of reckless
spending decisions by directors, and at the same
time guarantee (as a natural result) a closer
relationship between the interests of directors and
shareholders.
This is a point not missed (but ultimately not
endorsed) by Justice Neville Owen in his 2003
Report into the high-profile collapse of HIH
Insurance. Justice Owen notes:
… it is not immediately clear to me why a
substantial shareholding in the company should
be regarded as compromising independence. Such
a shareholding may provide greater incentive to
bring the interests of the company to bear. On
the other hand, the fact that a director has a close
personal association with the chief executive may
be destructive of independence, but is very
difficult to assess objectively or on a 'check-list'
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basis. The critical question, it seems to me, is not so
much whether, on objective criteria, the individual
is 'independent' but rather whether he or she is
subjectively capable of exercising independent
judgment (emphasis added).21
There is also quite a sizeable amount of
empirical evidence, both in Australia and overseas,
against the proposition that companies with a wide
and diverse shareholder body and a boardroom full
of independent directors perform better. For
example, University of Cambridge law professor
Brian Cheffins has observed that:
There is no meaningful correlation between
ownership structure and corporate performance. …
[I]t cannot be taken for granted that the widely held
professionally managed firm will yield superior
economic outcomes.22
According to Cheffins, while many large US
companies with a strong separation of ownership
and control have been tremendously successful,
there is empirical evidence that large companies in
European countries where ownership is more closely
held (indeed, ownership commonly remains in the
family) have been just as successful, if not more
successful, than their US counterparts.23
Similarly, as to the evidence in Australian
companies, Fred Hilmer and Lex Donaldson note that: 
The first assumption of the independent director
dogma is that boards made up predominantly of
independent outside directors produce better results
than boards made up predominantly of managers.
Researchers have examined companies to see
whether this is true. The results are fascinating.
Most studies fail to find that outsider-dominated
boards are associated with more profitable
companies. On the contrary, most studies find that
outsider-dominated boards produce poorer
company performance and that insider-dominated
boards are superior. These results are meaningful
because most researchers start out expecting to
prove that outside boards are superior. A majority of
managers on a board may reduce its independence.
However, this is offset by the insider board’s far
greater expertise in the company’s business, leading
to higher performance than under the outside
board.24
Although we do not deny that there is a definite
place in the complete corporate governance picture
for independent non-executive directors, it is
‘barking up the wrong tree’ to over-emphasise their
role and effectiveness. Time, energy and money will,
in our view, be better spent to adopt an open-
minded and inclusive approach to corporate
governance (see our definition of corporate
governance in Chapter 1 of Principles of
Contemporary Corporate Governance) rather than
adopting a narrow approach and focusing only on
selected areas of corporate governance like the
financial aspects of corporate governance or the role
and effectiveness of independent non-executive
directors.
Proposal to set up a shareholder
committee 
As we note in our book, however, this first proposal
to require that directors be made shareholders in the
company does not directly and demonstrably
advance the interests of the smaller shareholder who
does not have capacity or inclination to become a
director. We therefore propose that a method by
which their interests and concerns can be
accommodated within the corporate setting is to
embed a 'shareholder committee' within the
governance structure of public companies. This
would give all shareholders a forum through which
their views could be directly fed into the corporate
decision-making process.
There are a number of advantages associated
with such a proposal. Some of these are highlighted
by US law professor Edward B Rock, who argues that
grouping shareholders together through a
shareholder committee, and providing the
shareholder committee with a clear role within the
governance structure of the company alongside the
board and management, is the best way to increase
the rationality (rather than continuing the
irrationality) of shareholder action within public
companies.25
The shareholder committee within companies
should be comprised of a minimum of five and a
maximum of seven members, to be automatically
rotated every three years (to avoid any suggestion of
members of the committee becoming too close to
the board of directors). One member of the
committee would be chosen from the board of
directors, and one would be from a ‘professional
panel’ (an appointed lawyer, accountant, investment
banker etc). 
The committee would have mainly an advisory
role, acting as a conduit between shareholders and
management with a view to enhancing shareholder
participation and representation within the
company, rather than disrupting the day-to-day
management and oversight of the company. The
committee would also be the first port-of-call for
shareholder grievances, and would perform the
function of internal review. Shareholders who are
dissatisfied with particular aspects of the company's
commercial behaviour, or believe that the company
or the company's directors and similar officers have
engaged in a breach of the Act, could petition the
committee to hear the dispute and try and reach a
commercial outcome (within a limited time frame,
such as one week from the time of application)
which is satisfactory to all parties. This would
overcome the present sense of shareholder apathy
and disenfranchisement as shareholders would be
able to have their disputes heard promptly and
informally.
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The key role of the proposed committee,
however, would be to discuss and formulate
initiatives and policies to not only enhance
communication with shareholders in the short-to-
medium term, but also encourage the board and
management to implement strategies which make
shareholder communication a central aspect of a
company's corporate governance practices for the
long term. 
It is anticipated that the approach of the
shareholder committee will be very much policy-
oriented, with new issues and developments
occurring from time to time which will require a
considered committee response, with a view to
facilitating improved communication between
shareholders and the board, and enhancing
shareholder participation and representation. As
new issues emerge which potentially impact on
shareholder communication, it would be expected
that a company's shareholder committee,
particularly in the larger companies, would play
an important role in the development of the law
and reform proposals through formulating
submissions, and developing initiatives to be
implemented within the company, which can
then be adopted more broadly by companies. 
Regarding the powers of such a shareholder
committee, it is proposed that the committee
would have some role in the nomination of
directors, and perhaps some rule in setting (or at
least commenting throughout the development
of) compensation arrangements for senior
executives in the company. At the very least,
companies would be required to consult the
shareholder committee on director nominations
for a particular year, and on any significant
payments to the company’s executives. 
Conclusion
It is important to emphasise that both proposals
made in this article are centred on challenging the
widely held view that the division between
‘ownership’ (shareholders) and ‘control’ (directors
and executives) in the corporate setting is desirable,
particularly in large public companies. The
government’s support for shareholder participation
as a mechanism for achieving good governance
practices is significant, but more needs to be done
than just improve communication between the
company and its shareholders. This does not provide
for shareholder participation in the real sense of the
word. Shareholders can ‘lie on the couch’ and receive
company announcements in the mail day after day,
and still feel removed from the actual inner hub or
workings of the company. This is why we need to
make a concerted effort to substantially reduce the
separation of ownership and control in public
companies, so that shareholders that wish to ‘get off
the couch’ and play a useful role in the company are
given an avenue to do so. 
The authors have written a new book, Principles
of Contemporary Corporate Governance, published
by Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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